Work in Progress

Here you will find (some of) the things I’m actually working on:

Debunking Arguments
I’m investigating how the discussion on naturalistic theories of content bear on debunking arguments of morality.

Deception
I’m working on a new definition of deception in biology that might overcome the problems of current approaches.

Representations
I’m trying to figure out what are the minimal conditions for a state to qualify as a representation. The idea I would like to defend is that it has to do with their causal contribution to fitness.

Secession
I’m working on the theories on political secession. I argue that remedial-right only theories are too restrictive and that there are good reasons for a more permissive account.

Nations
I’m trying to defend a realist position on the nature of nations.

Bacterial communication
I would like to assess whether we should take at face the idea that microorganisms produce signals and how that claim fits with extant naturalistic theories of representation.

A Teleosemantic Theory of Cognitive Content
I’m developing a teleological theory of cognitive content, with some of the tools provided by Evolutionary Game Theory.

Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy
I’m currently working on a solution to this difficult problem.

Informational Theories
I’m interested in assessing to what extent informational theories can help to solve the problem of intentionality

Race
I’m trying to provide an original approximation to the debate on the metaphysics of races, which shows that both naturalism and social constructioinism are partially right.

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